

Christianity and Society

Recollections of War

by

Captain Roger Shinn

**Some Reflections on Imperialism
War and Peace**

by

Eduard Heimann

The Roots of Anti-Semitism

by

Chaplain Fred Denbaux

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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GROUP MEETINGS OF THE FELLOWSHIP

During the past season members of the fellowship who can not come to the meetings scheduled in New York have held separate meetings in Boston and in Amherst. Frank Littell is anxious to organize a group in and around Ann Arbor, Michigan, and it is also possible that Clifford Stanley will form a group in St. Louis. We are anxious not to have too much organizational machinery. At the same time the membership of the fellowship is scattered in all parts of the country and only a small fraction can attend the New York meetings. We would therefore like to encourage local groups to form and hold regular meetings.

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REINHOLD NIEBUHR

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EDITORIALS

The Atomic Bomb

Everybody recognizes that the atomic bomb has introduced a new dimension into the already complex realities of a technical society. Long before we had adjusted ourselves to the technical power, already in our possession, and brought it under the control of moral purpose and communal justice, we are confronted with this terrifying new dimension.

It is almost idle to speculate on the effect of atomic energy upon the peaceful industrial enterprise. We do not yet know how it will be harnessed to peace time pursuits, how greatly it will multiply the productive capacity of the worker in industry and to what degree it will therefore increase the perils of unemployment. The very fact that one thinks first of the perils of unemployment when one measures a new productive power, proves how far society is from socially mastering the technical instruments already developed. We may be certain of only one thing in regard to the influence of atomic energy upon the social structure: It will hasten the general tendency toward socialization, whether for good or ill. It will do this for two reasons. One is that atomic energy has been developed by

public funds; and the scientific labors, which have culminated in this achievement, have been cooperative and common. There is therefore slight possibilities of the alienation of this public resource into private hands. The other reason is that the potentialities of this new energy are too great to permit any group of private persons to determine how it is to be used and how communal adjustments in the productive process, occasioned by the introduction of this new power, are to be made. The more new inventions introduce vast new potencies into an already complex industrial process, the more it becomes necessary for the community as such to determine how the power is to be used for the sake of gaining a maximum contribution for the general welfare and reducing the perils to a minimum.

The actual introduction of atomic energy into the military might of nations presents even more tremendous problems than those occasioned by its possible introduction into industrial power. First of all it must be considered that atomic energy in military terms means destructive power. It is a weapon which can only be used, as it was used in the closing days of the war, for purposes of rather indiscriminate

destruction. This proves that "total" war is not a Nazi invention. The Nazi only hastened and accentuated an historical logic, implicit in a technical civilization. Technical society produces total war, because it enables men to harness the resources of a society for a certain end totally; and its instruments of destruction become more and more total. The thoughtful element in the democratic world has a very uneasy conscience about the use of the bomb against the Japanese. Critics have rightly pointed out that we reached the level of Nazi morality in justifying the use of the bomb, on the ground that it shortened the war. That is exactly what the Nazis said about the destruction of Rotterdam and Warsaw. They claimed that a brief conflict aiming at total destruction, was more merciful than a long drawn out war. In any case the use of the bomb was merely the culmination of our own strategy of total war, involving the use of ever more powerful obliteration bombing and incendiaryism. Mr. Churchill reported honestly on how he and President Truman reached the decision to use the bomb after it had become apparent that, without it, the war against Japan might last many more months. It is a simple matter to condemn the statesmen who made the decision to use the bomb. The question is whether they were not driven by historic forces more powerful than any human decision. If we remember that the bomb was developed in competition with the Germans and under the lash of the fear that they might perfect it before we did, it becomes apparent that it was not possible to refuse to develop it. Once perfected, it was difficult to withhold it when its use held out the prospect of a quicker end of the war. We

can criticise the statesman however for lack of imagination in impressing the enemy with the power of the bomb, without the wholesale loss of life which attended our demonstration of its power. Suppose we had announced the perfection of the bomb to the enemy; threatened its ultimate use and given some vivid demonstrations of its power in places where the loss of life would have been minimal. The moral advantage of such imagination would have been tremendous. As matters stand now, we have completely lost our moral position, particularly in the orient. We speak rather glibly of the necessity and possibility of repentance on the part of Japan, without recognizing how difficult we have made repentance for a vanquished foe who feels that he was defeated by the use of an illegitimate form of destructiveness.

In regard to the future, it is almost idle to speculate what effect the bomb will have upon military strategy or the prospects of peace. It increases the general horror of war and thereby presumably adds something to the power of the will of nations to achieve an orderly world. But as soon as we look at the problem in terms of the detailed politics of international relations we have less assurance. For the moment the possession of this power of destruction increases the political power of the nations possessing it. Ultimately it may equalize military strength because it places a fairly cheap form of destructiveness in the hands of even weak nations, provided they have uranium deposits. For the moment the possession of this destructive power establishes an even greater preponderance of power for the nations who hold the secret.

This fact might make for peace, though hardly for justice, provided that the great nations possessed this new power in common. But they do not. It is an Anglo-Saxon resource at the moment. The London Sunday Observer has noted that the unveiling of the bomb has given the western powers an advantage over Russia, which will prevent Russia from challenging them as soon as it might have done under other circumstances. But suppose Russia asks to share in the secret, as the London Daily Worker has already suggested that she should? And suppose the secret is withheld and Russia then proceeds to elaborate this energy herself? For the secret behind the bomb is hardly a secret. The formulae are now sufficiently well known to permit any one to develop them if they have the resources to do so.

It is, in other words, not probable that the introduction of this new energy will increase the unity among the hegemonous powers. It is much more likely that it will increase mutual apprehension among them. Thus there is no positive immediate gain for world peace in the introduction of this new destructive device.

The matter can be put more simply. The creation of a new dimension of military power could make the world more secure only if a stable universal government, which would have exclusive use of the power, could be presupposed. Lacking such a government and such a universal authority, a new power introduced into the military situation, accentuates disunion and not order.

Ultimately of course the bomb may make for peace; because it proves that

we must achieve an organized society in global terms or perish. But the prospect for the next decades, or indeed for the next century, is not reassuring.

The End of the War

The most tragic and costliest war of history came to a sudden end; yet the end was none too soon. Europe is subject to widespread famine and dearth of heating material. Another winter of war would have brought conditions on the continent, analogous to the black death of another war period.

The war has taught the nations some important lessons; but it is a question whether they have learned enough to build a stable world community. Britain has learned that she can not withdraw from the continent and we have learned that we can not withdraw from the world. Russia has learned that the dogma of an irreconcilable conflict between the capitalist and communist world must be sacrificed to the immediate necessity of creating a world hegemony with two great capitalist powers. Britain has learned that common poverty prompts a whole nation to deal more radically with the issue of "mine and thine." She is moving toward the socialization of property. America as the wealthiest nation of the modern day will, by contrast, also probably become the most conservative nation. France does not seem to have learned very much. She thinks she can prevent German aggression by moving her troops up to the Rhine; and at the same time she expects to protect her lines against the millions of Germans, who will live behind them, by a reconciliation with Germany. Two purposes have never been more incompatible.

The nations have learned that reparations can not be extracted from a vanquished foe in the manner of 1918. Instead they are going to move capital equipment out of Germany in order to reconstruct the industry of Russia and other nations which Germany destroyed. Whether enough will be left in Germany to maintain a healthy economy is a grave question. Very likely Germany will live in economic chaos; and the conditions of economic despair will not be conducive to a reestablishment of mental and moral health in Germany. There are, incidentally, evidences that the Nazi propaganda has poisoned the German mind far beyond the limits of the explicit Nazis. Germany is a very sick nation. The victorious nations are not going to be very successful doctors for this patient or penologists for this criminal, partly because no judge, who is a judge in his own case, is really just; and partly because the world has not yet learned that punishment has a very limited efficacy in inducing repentance and conversion. Nations are sometimes called upon to be the executors of divine judgment; but no nation as such has ever been the instrument of divine mercy. Nations are not very good executors of judgment because their own pride and their special interests interfere with the impartiality of their judgment. Yet in a rough fashion they do destroy the obvious forms of evil which threaten the community. But real mercy and forgiveness seems beyond the competence of nations. Their moral self-righteousness is too consistent to make genuine forgiveness possible. Beside, the Nazi evil was so diabolical that only very profound religious imagination can discern the common and mutual guilt which unites us with the foe. Na-

tions have not learned the meaning of the words "Let him who is without sin cast the first stone." Perhaps nations as such will never learn it.

The victorious nations have not learned how to deal with minorities or how to refrain from creating new minority problems. They are placing an almost intolerable burden upon Poland by incorporating millions of Germans into her sovereignty. This will create the usual difficulties, though there are suggestions that we will seek to evade them by applying a lesson we learned from the Nazis. We will forcibly evacuate German minorities from both Poland and Czecho-Slovakia and seek to find a place for them in what is left economically and geographically of Germany. Not very much that is wholesome has been learned on these detailed problems.

In our relations with Japan it seems that we will compound the pride of the victor with the pride of the white race. We have not learned humility. One of the greatest hazards to an ordered world will be the pride and power of the great nations, and more particularly of our own nation, which has suddenly, without much previous experience in imperial responsibilities, been placed in the position of the most powerful nation on earth.

"Americans United" the most prominent of our internationalist organizations has given us a typical example of American pride in recent weeks. They are anxious that the Japanese emperor be tried as a war criminal and they hail the dismissal of Under-Secretary Grew because the latter favored the policy of continuing the sovereignty of the em-

peror. "Upon what meat has this our Caesar fed, that he has grown so great" might be said of us. We are ready, with blythe unconcern for consequences, to destroy the traditional Japanese social and political system; and ready to rebuild it as a democracy through the beneficent instrument of an army of occupation. Nothing is quite so discouraging as the ignorant confidence of American liberals and democrats in our ability to bestow democracy upon the world by the pressure of our power. We have had a terrible war which has, we hope, taught some pacifists, that when evil incarnates itself in guns and tanks it must be met by guns and tanks. Now it seems necessary to go through a period of a terrible peace to teach non-pacifists that the efficacy of power and punishment is limited. We can prevent people from doing harm by power. We can prevent them from enslaving us. But we can not change their hearts by power. How tortuously mankind must learn its lessons; and how easily it perverts the lessons it has learned! Will it always take the awful lessons of a war to beguile us from the soft sentimentalities of pacifism; and then the additional lessons of an abortive peace to teach us the limits of the efficacy of power?

The same "Americans United" organization speaks of the unrepentant attitude of the Japanese in regard to their "super-race" theory. This is a perversion of history. The Japanese have never taught that the yellow race was superior to the white race. We came much closer to Nazism in believing that the white race was superior to the yellow race. The Japanese did believe that they were destined to lead the yellow race in redressing the wrongs done by

the dominant whites to Asia. They might actually have fulfilled that destiny, had their militarists not perverted their sense of justice completely; just as Germany might have fulfilled a creative role in Europe, had not the Nazis and the Prussian Junkers relied too much on force. The Japanese were guilty of a very treacherous attack upon us; but except for that attack our moral position toward them is not nearly as strong as our position toward Germany. It was our race theory which first poisoned our relations with Asia. And yet all the so-called idealists of "Americans United" warn against any softness toward the Japanese "super-race" theory. We have not yet learned how dangerous to peace and justice the moral pride of victors is.

The nations of the world have learned so much through the trials of this war; and yet they have learned so little. Because they have learned much we will have some slight abridgement of national sovereignty and the beginnings of a world organization. Because they have learned little, the scope of this organization will not suffice for the business in hand; and the policies below the level of that organization will be little better than the vindictiveness of other ages.

The Victory of British Labor

The Labor Party victory in Britain on July 5th was the most heartening single event since the beginning of the war. It was even more encouraging than the victory itself, which came a few weeks later, because that victory was a foregone conclusion and was finally achieved, or at least hastened, by the morally dubious use of the atomic bomb.

The labor victory was encouraging first of all because it revealed the tremendous resources of common sense among the common people. The British Tories had tried to gain a new lease on power, not only by trading on Mr. Churchill's immense prestige but also by an electoral campaign, dominated by Lord Beaverbrook, in which the most dishonest fears of the consequences of a labor victory were propagated. The British public had the good sense not to allow gratitude to a great war leader to determine its peace-time and domestic policy; and the wisdom to resent the character of the Tory campaign, rather than to be impressed by it.

More specifically the Labor victory was due to the movement of the British middle classes to the left. This is natural enough; for this war has impoverished the middle classes; and reduced the standards of living in the whole of Britain, for that matter. But though natural, it was not inevitable. We need only remember that impoverished middle classes on the continent after the last war, turned, in their hysteria, to fascism; and thus began the whole chain of events which culminated in the second world war.

It has been clear for some time that industrial workers, without middle class support can not dominate the political life of a nation, however strategic their power on the left may be. Britain is the first western nation in which the middle classes have given a clear sign of their understanding of the logic of modern political problems. This is probably due to the generally higher level of political wisdom in Britain than in other western nations; and also to the program of the Labor party, which has a

rigorous enough economic program but which has never engaged in a war upon the cultural and religious traditions of the western world in the manner of continental Marxism. Again and again continental socialists criticised their British colleagues for their alleged lack of Marxist consistency; but British Socialists are now given the chance to rule and renovate an empire while their continental critics are just emerging from concentration camps.

It is not only in comparison with the continent that the British labor victory is significant; but also in comparison with ourselves. We did indeed fashion a political program under Roosevelt in which labor and the middle classes were united. But it was a much more ambiguous and vacillating program than British labor has. Even now, as the war has ended, the nation is given to endless speculation, whether the new president will turn to the right or remain slightly left of center in the footsteps of his predecessor. Actually, but for the British labor victory, we might have expected a most certain turn to the right. The British situation has already affected the temper of congress. Will our conservatives dare to sell the vast public domain, acquired in the government erection of war plants, at a great discount, when the British government will use similar property to help achieve full employment? The British situation is bound to influence our own political history in coming years. It will not help us to form a party wholly analogous to the British party. Our approach to the goal of a more socialized society will be more tortuous and indirect. The fact that we are now the wealthiest nation on earth, and that our conservative

classes have the most curious nostalgia for the past of "free enterprise", will prevent us from following in the steps of British history. Yet in some respects we have followed British social history with a lag of about a quarter century. In any event the British labor victory is of immense value to the democratic cause, here and throughout the world as well as in Britain. One can make such an assertion even before knowing how well the party will carry out its electoral mandate. For it has a certain lease of five years on power, and is bound to set some new standards of social justice, which will effect the whole of western history.

It might be observed in passing that the labor victory has once more placed the democratic world in debt to Great Britain. There is a type of American liberalism and progressivism which has little appreciation of the political wisdom expressed in the institutions of a constitutional monarchy; and which sees only the mistakes and not the achievements of the British imperial politics. It fails therefor to grasp the immense contribution which Britain not only made in laying the foundations for modern constitutional democracy but is still making by its remarkable genius for combining reverence for the past and a spirit of adventure in facing the future; by its ability to preserve a continuous tradition without allowing it to harden into a barren traditionalism.

In foreign politics the gains of the labor victory are also tremendous. The victory puts a stop to Churchill's abortive efforts to keep discredited monarchs on the throne in Greece and Italy. It may furnish the lead for a creative economic reorganization of continental

Europe, which neither Britain nor America have thus far furnished. It will most probably contribute to the invention of a *modus vivendi* between Russia and the western world and thus reduce the peril of a third world war. It is not certain that the Labor party will accomplish this most difficult task; but the prospects of a more stable mutual accord between Russia and the west are brighter. The Labor party is almost certain to find a way of solving, or laying the foundation for a solution, of the India problem. Indeed the Simla conference before the Labor victory, partially broke the deadlock on India, which existed since the rejection of the Cripps proposals. We may be certain that labor will give a new impetus to the achievement of India's independence under Dominion status.

There are so many reasons for discouragement in a world, reduced to ashes and rubble by the most terrible war of history that we have a right to glory in encouraging developments. We must be careful not to expect too much of these developments merely for the sake of making our discouragements more bearable. But surely the Labor victory in Britain is genuine enough to offer encouragement which is not subject to such discounts.

Editorial Notes

There are so many unsolved problems in international affairs, that it is only just to remember one solved problem. The operations of the Lease-lend act transferred forty-two billion dollars worth of goods to our allies without raising the insoluble problem of war debts. In the last war only eleven billion dollars of war debts, which we in-

sisted upon regarding as a commercial debt, poisoned the relations of former allies for decades. The idea of lease-lend was one of Roosevelt's most brilliant pieces of statesmanship. It is regrettable that the effectiveness of this whole policy was slightly tarnished by the Truman's too abrupt ending of lease-lend aid, within less than two weeks after the conclusion of hostilities. War efforts can not be liquidated in such a fashion. While our army was declaring that conscription would continue because the war was not yet over, the president declared that it was over and that all help to our allies would cease immediately. The difficulties, occasioned by this too sudden cessation of help have since been overcome; but it has not been salutary for American-British relations.

It now seems probable that the Murray-Wagner "full employment" bill will pass in Congress, as it has the support of all labor groups and of many enlightened employers. It must be remembered however that the bill does not guarantee full employment. It does little more than reconstitute the agencies which were functioning under the National Resources Planning Board when a reactionary Congress abrogated that agency. Thus precious years were lost in preparing the nation to transfer its energies from war to peace and maintain security of employment in the process.

The Soviet-China pact has proved far more statesmanlike than most of us dared hope. Russia showed more restraint in her demands in Asia than most observers had anticipated. The pact has not only prevented serious friction between the western powers and Russia over Asiatic policy but has also pre-

sumably allayed the specter of a Chinese civil war. The unity of China is not sufficiently secure to be preserved without the presupposition of unity between the great allies. If they should fall apart, China would become divided. But the immediate prospects for unity are good.

About the Potsdam agreements on the occupation of Germany The London Economist declares: "The conviction that the peace proposed at Potsdam is a thoroughly bad peace is not based upon sentimental softening toward Germany. It is based on the belief that the system proposed is in the fullest sense unworkable. It offers no hope of ultimate German reconciliation. It offers little hope of the allies maintaining its cumbrous controls beyond the first years of peace. Its methods reinforce autarchy in Russia and consummate the ruin, not only of Germany but of Europe."

The New York Times reports that experts in Germany are convinced that the world will soon get tired shipping food into Germany, to prevent starvation. Germany, at its very best, was able to produce only 83% of its food. We have taken a quarter of her territory, are about to force some ten to fourteen million additional Germans from the lost territories into this rump of Germany, deprive her of the industry by which these people were fed and expect such a system to work.

There is something dismal about the invariability with which "just" nations become unjust in the exploitation of their victory. Our commissioner of reparations, Mr. Pauley, thinks we have avoided the mistakes of 1918; but he does not admit the new mistakes we are making in dealing with a fallen foe. We have prevented the reconstruction of the

economic life of Europe by the vindictive fears, which have determined our policy toward Germany.

We owe an apology in these columns to the religious delegation at the San Francisco conference, which we criticised in our last issue. Our criticisms failed to do justice to the excellent work which was done on the whole by our delegation in keeping us informed. We still think they frequently missed the

power-political realities under the pretensions of the conference; and they assessed the achievements of the conference too highly. But they, as all of us, were anxious that America should not fall back into isolationism. That peril, by the way, seems to be overcome. The peril for America is no longer that we will refuse to use our power in the world community, but that it has become so enormous as to tempt us to arbitrariness.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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The pressure of articles dealing with the war have caused us to postpone T. Finnegan's very informative article on "Christian Social Thinking in Ireland" which will appear in the next issue.

RECOLLECTIONS OF WAR

By ROGER SHINN

War and I made personal acquaintance last November on the Siegfried Line. With that acquaintance came fighting, capture, and several months inside Germany as a prisoner of war. Nothing happened to me that did not happen to many others. But the Fellowship may find interest in the recollections and thoughts of one of its members involved in the events of those tremendous days of our age.

The end of the war was an anticlimax. My climax had come a week before when I was liberated from the Germans by the advancing American troops. The fighting outfits in Germany, except in a few sectors, had completed their missions, and were simply waiting for someone in authority to tell them what they already knew—that the war was won.

On May 8, I was in Ingolstadt, on the Danube river, waiting for the planes which would take several hundred liberated prisoners out of Germany. Bombs had battered the town until there was no electricity or water. I was dirty, and went down to the Danube to wash. There was a battery of anti-aircraft machine guns on the bank, and the crew was listening to the radio. It was a long time since I had heard a radio. The voice was English; it might be the BBC news. I finished washing, put on my shirt, and walked toward the little group. I began to catch the words: "... and Mr. Churchill told me"—that was not a news broadcast! I moved closer and heard King George tell the

British nation of the end of the war. Firing would cease that night, at a minute after midnight.

Already my mind was in the Pacific. The anti-aircraft gunners were thinking of the same things. The broadcasts of the celebrations in Times Square seemed unnatural to us. I was glad that the King, and President Truman, in their broadcasts, both spoke of the Pacific war. I was glad when I learned that most of America greeted the news with sober gratitude and a renewal of resolution.

War is bloody, fiery, gruesome. It is anger and hatred, courage and generosity. It is boredom and fatigue. War is unnatural, yet it is life heightened to a tremendous pitch, where men are in different moments, or in the same moment, elevated to greatness of soul or degraded to their worst.

In war one sees much of life and death, more sometimes than men can stand. Death on the battlefield is an ugly thing. The pacifists used to quote the ancient lines, "It is sweet and fitting to die for one's Fatherland," and argue that those who said so had never tried it. Partly their ridicule was just. In mangled bloody flesh there is little to remind one of the ideals which are supposed to gleam through the dust and smoke of the battlefield.

Yet this physical horror is not what soldiers fear most. It is rare for a man to be cowardly in battle. Often men are incredibly brave. Self-respect, unwill-

ingness to let down their buddies, determination, responsibility — something keeps men going. Whatever it is, it is the proof that man is a spirit.

Yet men so longingly want to live. And this, too, is proof that man is a spirit. For it is not the horror of death, but the vision of a future that makes men want to live.

I remember the moment when death was nearest. Muscles tensed, nerves reacted, adrenalin glands poured out their secretions, as in all biological creatures. But the biggest things that happened were in the human mind. It is said that a drowning man sees his whole past life go swiftly before his eyes in the moment when he goes down for the last time. I never knew anyone who, when near death, felt anything like that. Rather it was a whole future life that flashed through our minds. In all these crises of the spirit, recollections and anticipations are fused. But mostly it was the future—the longing to live, the thoughts of home, the tiny irrelevant things, like clasping a hand or sitting and looking at someone, that somehow in the human mind mean the great things of life. Electricity cannot act faster than these impressions in the mind, steel cannot be sharper. Imagination becomes more vivid and real than fact.

Most men say that they pray at those times. But what they pray, I don't think they know. They just pray. For the mind, so swift in catching the flashing impressions of past and future, is slow in forming thoughts. I do not think it matters what they pray, if they know *to Whom* they pray. The tragedy of battlefield prayers is that few men know this *Whom*. Prayer, as St. Augus-

tine knew, does not depend on precise phrases or thoughts; it is real if it is prayer to the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

* * *

An officer's job is not so much to kill an enemy as to organize and direct the killing activities of other men. But battles disrupt theories and plans, and I shot to kill. In a way I had wanted to kill a German. It would be, in a sense, the final symbol of participation in this war, and of sharing in the guilt of a nation that fights a war. But if any think that shooting and watching a man drop are the stimulus for profound or original reflections, they are mistaken. "One less Jerry" is about as far as the mind goes at such a time. Battle may bring excitement, anger, hate, desperation, hope or fear, determination. It does not teach a man to love his enemies.

A prayer written for soldiers says, "Yet Lord in the heat of battle, still a temple be my heart." But my heart was not a temple. Maybe it should have been, but it wasn't.

That is why life needs repentance. War is only one of many times when a man finds that he cannot act with spotless motives. Yet he cannot forget that his motives should be pure. He cannot evade the dilemma, for he must act. If he is a Christian, he can find hope in repentance and forgiveness.

When I was a child, there used to be something frustrating in the communion service. It was, I had been taught, the symbol of God's forgiveness. The invitation to the communion table was to those who came "with hearty repentance and true faith," and "who intend to lead a better life." With the directness of

childish logic, this "turning over a new leaf" seemed a good idea; but I knew, even as the service went on, that another communion service was scheduled on a Sunday three months away. And this was the symbol of defeatism, even as I heartily repented and intended to lead a better life. But this is exactly the truth that Christianity sees when it knows that men must perennially repent and turn to God for forgiveness.

Some Christians have talked of loving your enemies while you kill them. I don't think we can do it; at least I couldn't. I was grim, excited, determined, when I killed, not loving. I knew I had to seek forgiveness.

* * *

Hunger is something that many people in America will never understand. In 600 miles of marching through Germany, I learned something about hunger. In our column of American prisoners, hunger was more than a feeling; it was a haunting sensation. It never left us. This was a hunger we had never known before. It was the hunger of men who marched every day, who could never fill their stomachs or find in food the energy they needed. We felt the weakness in our bodies and knew that we were getting scrawny. It was a new feeling to get up after ten hours sleep and still feel tired—not sleepy, but tired. Night after night we dreamed that we were eating. Hour after hour on the march we talked of food. Food became an obsession. In our column were a former restaurant manager and a soda fountain owner, and for entire afternoons at a time they "led the discussion" of food. We thought with envy of the soup lines in America's depression. We dreamed of magnifi-

cantly spending twenty-five cents a day on food. How much bread that would buy!

We could not pass a bakery without feeling a pang in our stomachs, and the smell of baking bread was almost too tantalizing to endure. Psychologists of some schools might have modified their opinions if they had been with us. I am sure that if a group of aproned German *hausfrauen* with bread in their arms had walked down the right side of the street, and a group of Earl Carroll's chorus girls in their stage costumes had waltzed down the left, all eyes would have turned right.

I wonder if hunger is not a bigger thing in human history than most of us realize. Perhaps this is the reason that many Americans cannot understand the indolence and lethargy of some of our southern negroes and "poor whites," or of vast Asiatic populations. I have no imagination of what hunger might mean when it lasts for year after year. It could have much to do with the hopelessness of millions in India and China. It makes more remarkable the vigorous energies of Chinese guerillas and of the Japanese nation.

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Two islands almost block the wide Oder river estuary, where it joins the Baltic. On one of these islands, Wollin, was a *Luftwaffe* training school. I saw this base in February, crowded with youngsters. Boys were training, girls were working. As we marched through the camp, I saw over the door of one barracks, a sign, "STALINGRAD." I was surprised and wondered whether I had read correctly. Yes, the next one said "TUNIS." And so on and on, each barracks named for a great battle that

the Germans had *lost*. Over another building was a German motto, "Who would live must fight." So that was it: the spirit of militant revenge lived in this school. I saw the youths march across the grounds in their snappy *Luftwaffe* uniforms. Their morale was superb, their marching precise, their singing boisterous. I looked at them and wondered. They had been sheltered from war and nourished on propaganda. Would the Nazis be able to preserve these boys through the war so that they would never feel the despondency and disillusion, the morbid pessimism of defeat, that was blanketing the rest of the nation? If so, they might remain fanatics in a country that was fast losing its desire for fanaticism.

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It was not often that American prisoners had a chance to argue with convinced Nazis. When they did, the Nazis usually dragged out all the ready-made arguments of their propaganda machine. They might say that the Jews controlled America, or give a line about German *Kultur*. But their triumphant thrust came when they asked, "How do you justify fighting on the side of the Bolsheviks?"

The German lived in terror of the Russians. His propaganda-nourished opinions were often gullible or ridiculous, but they were genuine. Americans, when asked this question, usually saw the uselessness of argument, and replied by asking what the German thought of his Japanese allies. This usually embarrassed the Nazi, and he replied that "confidentially" he had no love for the Japanese and did not really consider them an ally. I found one *Luftwaffe* lieutenant who defended the

Japanese. "You see," he said, "although they are not Nordic, they belong to a very ancient culture and cannot be compared with the Russian barbarians."

Russian prisoners in Germany were horribly mistreated. We saw columns of them, men and women, hobbling along in wooden shoes with no socks, emaciated and barely able to walk. Their captors starved them and beat them. Sometimes it was hard to see how they kept going. I remember one poor old man, apparently entirely blind, being led along the road by two of his comrades. When they saw Americans, they begged for tobacco. But if we gave it to them, we saw their guards strike them with rifle butts on their hands or even their heads.

The Russian laborers on farms were treated better, because a starving man cannot work. They were enthusiastic about seeing Americans, and sometimes shared their little food with us, in amazing generous friendliness.

We prisoners did not pretend to understand Soviet government policies, but as military men, we gave the Russians a professional admiration shared only by the American army. It seemed obvious to us that these two great countries, both so effective in accomplishing things, should team up to see that the world was run better. The friendliness of the Russian laborers strengthened this idea. And it seemed, from our peculiar perspective, unnatural that the political leaders of the two countries should be so reluctant to trust each other.

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The subject came up when a group of us, all American officer-prisoners, were jammed in a boxcar crossing central Ger-

many. Someone said that the American soldier did not know what he was fighting for. Others were quick to answer. The majority said that he *did* know what he was fighting for, and that especially we who had lived for a while inside the Nazi state, knew what freedom and democracy meant. But the sceptics kept questioning.

"Well, I know what I'm fighting for," said one officer. "It's for banana cream pies." He sounded as though he had got the idea from a newspaper quotation and thought it a pretty good one.

Someone pressed him for what he meant. "Of course, that's only a sort of symbol," he said. He never explained what the pies stood for.

The argument went on. It finally settled down to a couple ideas. Everyone granted that Nazism was a bad thing, that American democracy was in one way or another a good thing, and that the Nazis had to be licked. That was about as explicit as anyone got.

Nazis loved to try to embarrass Americans by asking them why they fought. The question often came up in military interrogation of prisoners. A civilian Nazi near Nurnberg once asked us, "You certainly don't believe that old Wilson stuff about democracy, do you?" Others said, "You have everything you need in America. Why do you come over here?" To the Nazi, with his boisterous parrotings of Goebbels and Hitler, the American's uncertainty was weakness.

The American soldier's convictions on what he was fighting for were not so uncertain as the Nazis thought. America had come a long way since the doleful

months before Pearl Harbor when Congress almost voted to send drafted soldiers home after their "year," and soldiers thought they were the victims of politicians. The soldier had got it resolutely through his head that Nazi Germany had to be defeated, because it was the enemy of peace and democracy.

But "peace and democracy" were synonymous with "home." Our strongest impulse was to get this war settled once and for all so that we could go home and not be bothered again. This is easy to understand for any who know the ugliness and dreariness of war. The trouble was that "home" became the only ideal of a soldier, the only symbol of peace and democracy. Peace was important because it meant comfort; what it might mean to other peoples and nations was secondary. "Banana cream pie" was too often a symbol of democracy.

The soldier recognizes, as civilian America seems to recognize, that our future is tied up with the future of the world. But many a soldier is coming home with a dangerously provincial attitude. His conviction that America is better than the foreign lands he has visited often has made him despise Europeans and think that the old America he knew before the war is the ideal of life. He agrees with the organization of the United Nations, but he really disdains foreigners and is blind to the weaknesses in America.

We use too glibly, sometimes, the hope that "these dead shall not have died in vain." Too often the soldier who dies for democracy thought of that democracy as the place where he would put the negro "in his place." Or, understand-

ably angered by the wartime activities of a few labor leaders, he died in the hope of returning to an America where he could show those unions a thing or two. Yet it is obvious that not every whim or passion of the dead can claim an obligation from the living. They died for a democracy that they believed in, though they may have often misunderstood it, and America owes its dead an obligation to make democracy as genuine as it can.

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A young RAF Mosquito pilot was with our column for a while. He had trained in Canada and spent furloughs in the States. Five years of war had aged him beyond his years, but he was still very youthful in many ways. He was a political radical, convinced that Churchill would not last beyond the peace. His own interests were in Sir Richard Acland's radical party. I asked him how many people in England thought as he did. He did not know, but was sure that Britain would swing far to the left after the war.

He was very cynical about the war and its possible results. Completely secular, he remarked that the British army was much less religious than the American. That I considered a strong statement. For him, the Church of England was the symbol for most of what was wrong with Britain. I asked him what he knew about the late Archbishop Temple or the Malvern Convergence. He had never heard of either.

Despite his radical enthusiasms, the pilot's cynicism extended to human nature, and he had little hope of society's getting beyond its present confusion. The best chance, he thought, was in Lin

Yutang's idea of contentment. If men could be made biologically happy, by a social order that would feed everyone and take the worst discomfort out of life, people would perhaps be amiable and get along. I told him I was more cynical than he there, and suggested that ambition of men caused more unrest and tyranny than hunger. He doubted it.

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For stark terror, there are few things worse than a bombing. We were on the outskirts of Nurnberg when the Flying Fortresses came over. The powerful bombers, so majestic in their flight, are terrible in their destruction. When it was over, and we had gathered together the dead and tried to help the wounded, we knew we could never forget it.

So this was strategic bombing. We were a group of American army officers, all combat veterans and professional "brave men." All called this experience the most terrifying, or among the most terrifying, that they had ever known. But this was the experience that the civilians of these cities were facing, not once or twice or three times, but day after day. Some of them could sit out the bombings in shelters, but many could not. And to experience this, time after time, week after week, to see it coming and coming through an endless future—that was worse than anything ninety per cent of our soldiers would ever know.

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Few men in a war actually fight it. It is an old story that many men on the ground are necessary to keep one plane in the air, and that many behind the lines support one man up front. But even among combat troops, few have the

intimate contact with slaughter and destruction that the front line infantryman knows.

The airman knows extreme danger as well as anyone. Yet, he seldom *fights*. The silver bombers in their perfect formations seem to move across the sky with Olympian calm. Even Zeus on Olympus, for that matter, had to *hurl* his thunderbolts, while the bombardier methodically sets his sight and presses the bomb release. A group of airmen who joined our column one day confessed their shock at going through Nurnberg and seeing the damage their planes had accomplished. They had known, they said, of the power in their bombs; but this close-up sight of destruction was something new.

One of the air commands in England sent its ground crews over Germany after V-E Day, so that these men might see what their labors had helped accomplish. But they will never know half the story.

I almost wish that everyone in our armies might somehow have a moment of fighting the enemy face to face, of this intense dealing in death that has been so common to some. It might do some good.

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It was ironical that the German army, which unleashed *Blitzkrieg* and armored warfare upon the world, should spend its last months showing the world how to fight with a few weapons and a few horses. When the end came, the Wehrmacht had nothing. In the last days, I was never far from whatever "front-line" defenses Germany had; yet I saw no supplies, and no weapons except the rifle and *Panzerfaust*, which a single

man could carry. There were not even the farmers' hay wagons, which a month before had carried ammunition forward.

It was a sharp contrast, after liberation, to move into the American rear area. Mile after mile I saw the tanks and trucks and stacks of ammunition. Well as I knew my own army, this tremendous power was impressive. It must have been doubly so to the German people who had been watching the ragged remnants of their pitiful army withdraw. If they had any doubt that they were defeated, this display of pure military power should have been convincing.

It would be dishonest to say that mental hunger has the torturing urgency of physical hunger. But as quickly as my stomach began to feel satisfied, my mind felt the pains of emptiness. In the early days of liberation I hunted ravenously for news magazines and books. What I could read depended on what was available. So it happened that on the ship coming to America I happened to read two interesting little books.

One was on modern mathematics, entertainingly written by two enthusiasts who proclaimed mathematics as "a philosophy leading to the good life." If statesmen could meet the world as the mathematician approaches his problems, we could solve our world disorder. The other book was on logical thinking, and held the promise of real democracy when we solve national and international problems "by scientific methods of thought, purged of all irrelevant emotions." The author, a little less buoyant than the mathematicians, thought that this would probably take a long time.

How little these writers, in their book-world, understood the imponderable immensities of life in 1945. I thought of proclaiming the gospel of mathematics to the despairing Germans, or purging of irrelevant emotions the patriotic Poles who had fought through the war for a futile idea. It was ironical to read these books on the way home from history's worst war. The gasping continent I had left would not leave my mind. I could only think: God give me humility. God be merciful to me a sinner.

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The first American civilian that I talked to in almost a year was a business man working for the telephone company. I met him inside the army post near Boston, where I landed. After months of conditioning to army abruptness, the pompous self-satisfaction and ingratiating joviality of this man made him seem like a Sinclair Lewis caricature. He offered me a ride in his car to another part of the post. I asked him how much gasoline the ration boards would give me on my leave. He was not sure, but told me what he knew. Then he added, "But if you take home plenty of cigarettes, you'll be able to get all the gas you want. You can easily

find a filling station where they'd rather have those cigarettes than ration coupons."

This man knew I had just returned from Europe. He should have known that I would have some idea of the seriousness of this war. Yet he took it for granted that I would probably want to beat the rationing set-up and would be pleased to know that it was easy to do.

This was my reacquaintance with America. It was not a cheerful one. America, despite shortages, gave the impression of wealth and plenty—including food. This made newspaper stories of black markets and complaining politicians sickening. It was a relief to find most Americans making few complaints and trying to obey the law.

America was not the same as I had left it. Despite Bilbo's filibuster and Rankin's demagoguery, despite columnists' empty ideas of Europe and people's warped attitudes toward Japan, America had matured in a year. It had to be clubbed into us, but we had learned something about our place in the world. America's ideas of the world's future were confused and often wrong. But at least we knew this time that we had to do something about that future.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON IMPERIALISM, WAR, AND PEACE

By EDUARD HEIMANN

I

Imperialism no doubt is the most direct expression throughout history of the lust for domination and for profit. But more and more fear turns out to be the principal motive behind imperialism in this age.

If it were not the positive stimulus of the lust for power and profit, then it would still be the fear of the rival's power which would prompt imperialism. One may dislike the idea of occupying a foreign territory but may feel forced to do it if this territory might otherwise become an outpost of and springboard for a threatening power. This is the most vicious of vicious circles; it can drag into the vortex of war powers neither of which desires it but either of which is suspicious and fearful of the other. Most of the deeply alarming developments between the victorious powers at the end of the European war come under this heading; and the more they may seem to be thereby exculpated morally, the less comfort can we draw therefrom, because that means that in a dynamic world no ill-will at all, nothing indeed but mutual fear, may be needed to produce the final catastrophe of mankind. It follows that the moralists cannot help us at all in these international dangers; only a patient unraveling of the knotty issues of power can possibly save us from the tragic circle.

Some may argue, it is true, that ill-will is not only in the desire for expansion

but just as much in sticking to the loot of former expansion; that it is only the "haves" who are thus punished for their former sins. This is one version of the pacifist prejudice, that if we would only do away with power all would be well. But the argument does not help us, for two reasons. In the first place, experience disproves that prediction. The United States had gone to great lengths in following that line of policy by setting the Philippines free. It is true that she has not outrightly given up the Philippines; but she has not held them with adequate force either. She has thereby facilitated Japanese aggression and had to pay dearly to restore the islands to the loyal Philippines. Something similar might happen in India the moment when Britain withdrew. For there is never a vacuum of power. This is the true story of the much romanticised self-determination of nations. To abandon a position of power is to fail a responsibility, much as that power also invites the temptation of abuse. It follows that democracy must not give up a power that it holds.

In the second place, however, dissolution of empire in the sense of a mere withdrawal from a position of power is not a political possibility and can, consequently, not in fairness be used as a moral yardstick. No country and no political group can be expected to act strictly against their own interest. There are only very rare individuals who can

really sacrifice their interests and ultimately themselves; but a responsible statesman cannot and must not sacrifice the interests of his group and must not be judged as if he could or should. Gandhi's much misunderstood policy certainly is not one of sacrifice. Its unique moral achievement and political potentialities must not be underrated; it does raise the political struggle to a higher plane. But this is not at all identical with self-sacrifice. Rather the contrary is true: it is a particularly astute political procedure designed, not to give up however much or little power one may have, but to enhance and enlarge it; a better means to the end than the time-honored means of physical force. It is embarked upon with a view to political success and this is what essentially distinguishes it from sacrifice. Nor is it generally applicable; appealing as it is to the sense of honor and chivalry in the adversary, it may strengthen these qualities where they are, as in the British, but can never produce them where they are not. The programatic non-violence of Jehovah's Witnesses has not prevented the Nazis' torturing them to death.

Imperial democracies cannot give up their empires, and if they could, this might breed more problems than it would solve. But this does not mean at all that everything must remain as it is and nothing can be done. For in the symbiosis of democracy and imperialism it is by no means only democracy that is exposed to a corrupting influence; it is just as logical and real that democracy corrupts imperialism. And while it is quite uncertain that this transformation of imperialism may go fast and deep enough for what we need, it is far too

important a movement to be ignored, particularly since its existence proves that there is here a positive force that can be developed.

Some of the striking features of the British Empire are well known. In the case of India, not only are the rebels permitted to live and work and propagandize throughout the world, which proves a liberal rule not to be found in other empires, but the much suspected and certainly inadequate Indian self-rule under British supervision has produced the stupendous result more and more to eliminate British goods from the Indian market by way of a protective tariff directed against England. To those who believe in a democratic and socialist India once the British would pull out, that result of incipient Indian self-government may appear disappointing; the dominant Congress Party is essentially a party of big capitalists. But the point is that British imperialism in India is far beyond the stage of economic exploitation; it is political and military.

The Boer Republics, within a few years from their subjection and annexation, were given Dominion status, which included their freedom to stay out of the motherland's war for her life against Hitler, as proven by the extremely vocal opposition in South Africa against joining the war. The Irish Free State, another Dominion, did so stay out and declared her neutrality. If this proves, on the one hand, little sympathy for Britain and Eire, it proves, on the other hand, that the supposedly ruling British respect the freedom that they gave this Dominion as the others. It proves that those Dominions which joined the

motherland in the war did so of their own free will.

The young statesmen of the French Popular Front before the war set out to realize an elaborate program for a revitalized rural economy in North Africa, resting on the distribution of state-generated electrical power and organized in a system of village cooperatives. They would have taught the world a lesson if it had not been for the sad interruption of all their efforts by the catastrophe; and since then French foreign policy has been one of anxious self-assertion rather than that of pioneering reform. But it is fair to predict that those efforts will be resumed. For the authors have understood that, far from dissolving empire, one must consolidate it by democratizing it; and their idea was to democratize it economically, as the British do it politically.

Our own Good-Neighbor-Policy culminated in the administration refusing its diplomatic—and ultimately military—support to the powerful financial interests which clamored for intervention when Mexico expropriated their oil properties to nationalize them. This event carries a lesson in the theory of imperialism; it teaches that the simple economic theory of imperialism is inadequate. According to this theory, the government must back the financial claims of private imperialism because the government is only “a committee of the ruling class.” But the Good-Neighbor-Policy proves that the democratic people, as in domestic policy, tries to organize its political power for the rescission of privilege, and that the withdrawal of political power destroys economic imperialism. The American, British, and French, examples teach us that imperial-

ism, however important the economic motive in it, is essentially a political phenomenon and can be both cut back and reorganized by political means.

The call for democratic power, for democratic preparedness, for democratic penetration of imperialism rather than retreat from empire and leadership must be guarded against misunderstanding and abuse. They can and must be advocated because democratic power is lawful power in international as in domestic relationships. That the law can be broken in an emergency is no objection to the law and no encouragement to break it. The fundamental idea of democracy is to limit order by liberty and liberty by order. The inordinate liberty of the strong to oppress the weak, which internationally is imperialism, and the inordinate liberty of sovereignty, which breeds anarchy between the equally strong, must be bound by a law of order and justice. That democracy, properly understood, has this law in itself makes it a hopeful, though not at all infallible, instrument for peace.

This can readily be seen from the attitude particularly of the British towards international law. Our side had several minor violations of international law on its record in this war. But we were anxious, in each case, to point out that it was a violation indeed. Compare with this the record of the Nazis, who in the beginning of the war seemed anxiously intent upon breaking every neutrality and each time excused it on the ground that they had only come to prevent a violation by the British.

It is quite true, naturally, that it would have been much to the British

strategic advantage to violate the neutrality of Holland, Belgium, Norway, and particularly Ireland, and this was publicly said in so many words. In the case of Ireland, the problem merges into that of the Empire. The temptation was terrific to extinguish the lights of Dublin, point of orientation for the German fliers right across from their objectives in Britain; also to dissolve there the 1,000 men strong German Embassy; the centre of espionage and sabotage in Britain; most of all to retake the South Irish ports which the Chamberlain government had spontaneously returned, over Churchill's protest, to Eire as a bid for reconciliation, beyond the terms of the treaty which gave Eire its freedom and retained these ports for British military occupation. It was these ports from which one could have stopped the submarine pestilence. Britain was in mortal danger as never before in 900 years; but she refrained from doing any of those things, out of respect for her given word.

Such raising of the standard of behavior is not irrevocable, of course. Just as an individual, if driven to desperation, may strip away all higher standards and be reduced to the condition of a wounded animal, so this may happen to a nation or group. But it need not do so; and the British example of defending the attained standard under frightful strain, and finding in this loyalty a final repentance and justification is a hope at a time when we need some hope. If we accept, for the sake of argument, the thesis that international law originated from the search of profit, as a means of commercial interests, then we must admit that the respect for international law has outgrown the purely "ideological"

stage and has become a reality in its own right to the extent that democratic prestige and self-respect have come to depend on it.

II

There is no doubt, after all these discussions, that power can be democratic, in war and peace. Even empire, certainly the worst problem of democracy, can be democratized. The British Commonwealth was so democratized politically, parts of the French Empire economically, and the relations of our own country to her weaker neighbors and associates point the same lesson. Power, as in Britain, can be imbued with a strong sense of its lawful obligations to other countries as a part of its self-respect. Power becomes democratic by becoming responsible.

The conclusion thus reached is contrary to the time-honored idea of collective security through a League of Nations, a super-state. It appears so logical, that in order to make power internationally responsible, one must pool it and make it the power of an international organization representative of the community of civilized nations. Power, always fraught with the danger of abuse, would thus be lifted to a higher plane of organization, and as the forces of union absorb the power of the participant states, the forces of division on their lower plane would remain powerless. This is the idea of collective security, which logically anticipates and makes its starting point what, unfortunately, can only result from organic growth in international conscience and responsibility.

The vision of an artefact of collective security has failed once and would fail again if tried, because it assumes that

power can be transferred at will; it ignores the essential nature of power as an aspect of vitality. It imagines that power is just an abstract name for a police force. It thus represents an important step forward from the theories that power is either a superstition believed in or a bundle of economic interests. The advocates of the new idea pride themselves on their realism, on their thinking in tangible terms. But their realism is just as mechanistic and abstract as their former idealism was. A police force can be armed and salaried by an international body as easily as it is today by a national organization; this is the idea. But a peaceful order, domestic or international, can be created only by some degree of voluntary or at least tacit acceptance on the part of the founding groups. Neither a state nor an international order can be based on the police force alone. Some kind of fundamental agreement on the pattern of life, some spiritual and social homogeneity, are indispensable to a peaceful order. These, in turn, depend on mutual interests, on the one hand, and on the imponderables of life, such as tradition, loyalty, and prestige, on the other hand. Power, being a compound of physical force, interests, traditions, and prestiges, cannot be transferred at will.

More concretely, the United States, even if it would, could not give up its sovereignty. U.S. means a concrete person whom we love, admire, and criticize, but definitely know—to whom we can be loyal. The League is no person and it cannot command our loyalty, except in a purely intellectual way which is not the way of the people. The object of this loyalty, to be sure, includes moral

qualities; but the moral qualities have grown in that person and with him and cannot be given him at will nor transferred from him to some other place. We have to use the power where history has grown it; we can try to make it more mature but we can transplant it as little, according to the utopia of the League, as we can abolish it, according to the pacifist utopia.

It was a rude awakening indeed for most of us when we began to realize that this is so. For what it implies is that, while we may have peace, we are far from a position where we could guarantee it. We may have it in a patient and persevering effort to build up the sentiment of mutual obligation and iron out difficulties, always on the level of concrete problems. We cannot secure peace because there is no point in reality, as there is in logic, to which we could rise in order to deduce from it the means to be applied for an organization of peace.

A technical point of greatest importance has added to the shock and promoted the unwelcome insight: the fact that in a world where there are ultimately only two biggest powers, with a third of much lesser weight somewhat precariously associated with them, there cannot be collective security against an aggressor. The point has well been made by Raymond Gram Swing. For the idea of collective security presupposes that overwhelming power can be mustered against any one potential aggressor; the more participants there would be, the more overwhelming their power, provided one could unite them. But there cannot be collective security from either American or Russian aggression because the aggressor would be

approximately as strong as the forces of defense, and the police action itself would be tantamount to the global war it is designed to prevent. No organizational trick can then help us, but only the growth of democratic checks on power, the penetration of power with democratic conscience. That this is not a utopian idea but a real process in history could be shown; whether it will develop, and can be developed, fast enough to overtake the danger of conflict out of mutual fear is the terrifying question, to which there is no answer in advance. The United Nations is the organizational form of the hope that we shall succeed.

If we do, it will be only in trembling and anxiety. For there will be many injustices we will have to take into the bargain, for the sake of peace. Nothing could be more paradoxical, more contradictory in itself, since it is injustices which produce conflict and endanger peace. And yet, however paradoxical, it will be true and will highlight the precariousness of our situation for years to come. We will have to pay with the acceptance of injustices for the preservation of peace. For if peace is preserved, there is the hope that we may succeed in righting the wrong; if the conflict is permitted to degenerate into war the victim and the avenger are likely to perish with the perpetrator of the injustice.

Even greater than the danger from injustice is the other danger, from mutual fear. Its objective possibilities are growing all the time, with every single step that an unleashed technology takes to perfect our mastery of nature, which can always be turned into greater perfection of the means of destruction. We have shuddered when we read about the Ger-

man plan to harness the solar heat to the burning of a hostile country without any military operation. We have shuddered to realize that every technological invention destroys positions of power and creates new positions of power in a potential conflict, and that, for reasons of fear, it may become advisable to use that new power at a moment's notice before a rival power has caught up and may surpass us. We have witnessed in our life-time how the age-old limits which geography drew to military power, such as an insular position, have been annulled by the development of aviation. If the world was in danger when military power was conditioned by static terms of geography, what will the tension be as military power is more and more a function of fast-moving technology, with the inventive genius of man caught in the devilish logic of its own achievement? Our ally in the desperate struggle, on the other hand, will also be our fear. Mankind must do or die.

III

While the slow and gradual democratization of power is proceeding, and explosive movement in the opposite direction has taken place during the war, because of the technological development. It has been impossible so far to subject the most recent and unaccustomed form of military power, air-power, to any rule of humanity. In the beginning when Hitler's aviators seemed to control the skies, we used to attribute the inhumanity of airpower to Hitlerism. Subsequent events, however, taught us the lesson that we ourselves were not immune from the enormous temptation of indiscriminately using this most terrible weapon for speeding up victory.

Former ages have known rules of warfare, even a law of war. How idyllic and chivalrous the world was in the period which our intellectual conceit and blindness call the "dark ages," when the French commander invited the British army arrayed in battle against his own: "Be the first to shoot, gentlemen from England." Even in the First World War it was considered a crime deliberately to destroy civilians who did not engage in hostile action. In our days the idea of total war, born of the warped minds of Spengler, Ludendorff and Hitler, has conquered us all. It is true that American and British troops have not killed hostages as a military action. And of course we have not engaged in torture and destruction of civilians as an end in itself, as the Nazis have done on a grand scale with scientific thoroughness. But we have answered their warfare against civilians in kind, and with the multiplied efficiency of our many times superior technological power.

Two strands of motives are discernable. In the first place we exacted retaliation. A highly conscientious reporter, Drew Middleton of the New York Times, has it that the British fliers, in bombing Hamburg, concentrated on the thickly populated districts in retaliation for the raids on the British cities; they killed 400,000 out of a pre-war population of one and a half millions. The other motive is to break the enemy's morale and production and thereby save our soldiers' lives. The percentage of civilians killed in Dresden by the American fliers was even larger than the Hamburg figure, according to the American Red Cross. The argument that these cities could have avoided their fate by

surrendering in time does not carry weight since at that time they were far behind the front lines, with no one to surrender to within reach. The argument from the saving of soldiers' lives is unanswerable. And it was supported by indignant voices of American soldiers and protests against the suggestion that enemy civilians should be preferred to them. Hence one is directly driven to the conclusion that the more enemy civilians are killed the more of our boys are saved; if the enemy population is exterminated there is no more danger from that quarter.

This consideration is supplemented and confirmed by the observation that civilians are strictly forbidden to attack soldiers; if they do they are liable to court martial. This of course is a residue from the arrangements of the centuries which gave civilians a privileged position; civilians must not deceitfully abuse their immunity from attack. Now civilians are not only not immune from attack, they are strictly outlawed. It is legitimate for soldiers to deliberately and indiscriminately attack them and burn thousands and hundreds of thousands in order to break their morale and production; but civilians must under no condition strike back against the privileged aristocracy, the military, who may be attacked only by their peers, the military of the other side, but must feel safe from attack by such civilians as they may choose as their targets.

A further qualification is that we are perfectly ready to sacrifice more of our soldiers than is required for military victory if a special political interest seems to demand this. Our generals were very anxious to push their drive through the

heart of Germany beyond the appointed line of the zone of occupation allotted to them up to Berlin, when the Russians seemed to be stalemated before the city. The drive was abruptly stopped, however, by a Russian categorical demand to that effect. It is obvious that on this occasion not only the Russians, but we too were prepared to sacrifice to a political advantage or a gain in military prestige more soldiers than necessary for victory. Likewise the quarrel with the French over our failure to equip greater numbers of French troops reveals that we prefer American victories, to be paid for by American casualties, to French victories over the common enemy, presumably for political reasons. This, of course, given the political reasons, is a rational policy.

Completely irrational, from the military and political points of view, is the order not under any condition to shoot on buildings, given the French troops by General Juin when in the Italian campaign they attacked Siena, one of the treasures of mankind. It is rational, of course, as one discerns the characteristic French respect for mankind's spiritual achievements, expressed in stone and color, as legitimate. But the most disquieting deflection from the simple logic of our bombing practice is found in the fact that the Russians, whom no one suspects of degenerate softness, refrained from any area bombing, which their airforce, much weaker than ours, could nevertheless have performed on a smaller scale. There is even evidence to prove that the Russians disliked the American air strategy and protested against it, although they later praised its contribution to military victory. There are two possible explanations for the Russian

attitude. From an economic point of view they might have had in mind the reconstruction of their own country, for which they would need German industrial capacity and German equipment, which to the Americans is the strongest single competitor anywhere in the world. From a long-range political point of view beyond victory, the Russians, who were much quicker than the Americans in both punishing criminals and reviving the spirit of a broken people, may have doubted the expediency of such measures of reprisal as may endanger future attempts to persuade them to humanity and decency.

This sketchy survey should make it abundantly clear that, if mankind is to survive, it is not sufficient to concentrate on the prevention of armed conflict. For should such an attempt fail, mankind would be physically doomed. It is equally necessary to set definite limits to the ways in which armed force is used, limits such as a less enlightened age had considered a matter of common decency. Now it is no longer that; it is a condition of survival. There are two alternative ways of surviving: by an agreement on the limits of armed force, or by a preventive attack on our potential enemy to wipe him out before he can wipe us out.* The logic of military technique will insist on the second way being much safer. But this writer for one would not want to live in a world where we have wiped out all potential enemies and are alone to survive. It may be pertinent to mention that this writer has never in his life for a minute adhered to any brand or degree of pacifism, which is contrary to his deepest convictions.

* Written the day before the "atomic age" was ushered in.

THE ROOTS OF ANTI-SEMITISM

By FRED DENBAUX

All sensitive Christians today will admit that anti-semitism rests upon the failures of the Christian faith. The problem has not been ignored by the Church. Yet in spite of vigorous moral pronouncements, in spite of education in regard to prejudices, anti-semitism not only continues but increases. This fact can force us to seek two different answers. In the first place, we can assume that we failed simply because we didn't attack the problem with sufficient force. We shall therefore regroup our forces and, with a tremendous expenditure of effort, slay this dragon for once and for all. The second method of approach is to accept the fact of our failure and to realize that some inner contradiction within our own message has prohibited us from being persuasive.

It is this second thesis which, in view of our failure to overwhelm the world with moral pronouncements, deserves attention on our part. Protestantism, as the expression of prophetic Christianity, must seek the answer to this tragic problem, not outside of itself, but within its own presuppositions, primarily within its own failure to comprehend and to accept the peculiar destiny generic to its origin.

Sociologists and educators cannot solve the problem of anti-semitism. Neither of these groups fully understands how much our unrelieved guilt has to do with our prejudice against the Jew. Psychiatry would be helpful in pointing out that western culture is not altogether unwilling to see the Jew de-

stroyed in order that an "unsolvable" problem might be obliterated. But all of these interpretations will fail because only religious thought can understand the mystery of human stubbornness. We must understand that anti-semitism is firmly welded, not lightly cemented to culture. This does not mean that education and understanding cannot do much to illuminate our prejudices for they can, but what they are not able to do is to persuade us of either the depth of our prejudice or of the need of relinquishing them.

Protestantism forsakes its radical understanding of human nature when it capitulates to purely cultural attempts to eliminate this evil. Protestantism, more than it is willing to admit, is an unhappy champion of Jewish justice. There may be some psycho-therapy in addressing our consciences with the task of overcoming our prejudice. But such an attempt will be a failure unless we fully understand not only that *we* are anti-semitic but also the reasons for our being so.

Humanism is not too helpful in overcoming this problem. It does not fully understand the radical evil of human nature. As Christians we should see that the theological "evil" with which the Reformers were so much concerned, has found its concretion in our individual and collective resistance to our destiny as children of God.

The Jew is not hated either because of economic or cultural reasons except

insofar as these are on the surface and are the perennial and contemporary expression of a much more profound antithesis between Judaism and Western Culture. But the Jew is a crucial problem to *us* because he is a symbol of a religious culture which points to the chinks in our own armor. Every culture, save one, has asserted itself and forged its own independence and, by both historical necessity and national pretension, has placed itself in the center of history. Classical Hebrew culture antagonized the world by declaring that there already was a center to history. For Hebrew culture discovered in its own insufficiency the majesty and sovereignty of God. No other ethnic group conceived of a God so wholly removed and so set against all human assertions of sufficiency. *For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.*

Western Civilization which represents the wedding of Graeco-Roman culture with Hebraic cultures has, ever since, been trying to effect a divorce. Hebraism, as a prophetic and transcendent view of history, has made it difficult for Western civilization to rest lightly in its pretensions. Anti-semitism is our answer to the problem posed by this wedding of conflicting cultures. Destroy the symbol of Hebraic culture and the uncertainty of our conscience as well as the reality of our guilt is obliterated. Resisting our destiny we must destroy those who call that destiny to mind. Until we surrender to that destiny the Jew will not be safe.

In such a conflict of cultures, man not God becomes sovereign: therefore the Jew must go. Thus the Jew is always the "enemy" of an idolatrous culture. The persecution of the European Jew by the Nazi regime is a necessary consequence of the complete idolatry of that regime. If our own attitude toward the Jew is not quite so clear, it is because our own idolatry is not quite as developed and clearly concentrated. Furthermore there is an uneasy current in our own half hearted defense of the Jew. The zeal with which some of us oppose anti-semitism is not so much due to our love of justice as we would like to think. What is also involved is our own guilty conscience which manifests itself in a frantic, but often abortive, effort to prove to the world that we are without prejudice and contradiction.

This is why humanism does not help us. It glorifies our superficial attempts to free our conscience by an act of identification with those who have so suffered at our hands. But we cannot obscure history and history presses in upon us, overcomes our rationalization, and convicts us as triflers.

The work of education must not cease. But we Christians must understand our resistance to, and our half hearted support of, a Lord, in whom culture is never fulfilled until it is first negated. *For whosoever will save his life will lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall find it.* If our faith were founded in the Biblical conception of obedience instead of the 18th century idea of freedom, we would not be so confused about the moral responsibilities of our world.

In our present situation it becomes clear that we have saved ourselves from the domination of a single tyranny to plunge ourselves into the fratricide of conflicting tyrannies. We shall have illustrated, with terrible clarity, our resistance to the only sovereignty which could give us peace. In that conflict the Jew will face, not one, but many Hitlers. The Jewish problem is not separate from our total problem of community. But the Jew is the focal point, the barometer by which that lack of community is measured. There will be peace for no one until the Church takes seriously the problem of human

and divine sovereignty. And once it becomes serious, then it will understand true sovereignty for it will be in desperate need of grace in order that it may match the demonic resistance of culture with a courage and a faith that will not wilt.

Anti-semitism, our uncertainty about grace, our illusions about rationality and freedom, and our continued resistance to a sovereign Lord, are of one and the same piece. In a faith which recognizes His sovereignty and our resistance to Him, do we dare to lay hold of that Grace by which "my people Israel" shall be set free.

THE NAME OF OUR FELLOWSHIP

At its June meeting the Fellowship of Socialist Christians again discussed the question whether it ought to change its name. It was decided that a change of name could result only from holding a referendum of the entire membership. There was a division of opinion among the members present at the conference, on this question.

Those who wish the name changed give as reasons.

1. That the word "socialist" in our name makes it difficult to promote the Fellowship in the South or in our middle-class churches or in the conservative sections of the country.

2. That the unpopularity and lack of strength of the present socialist party makes the name seem a disadvantage.

3. That the word "socialist" does not adequately express the convictions of many in the fellowship who do believe in the social ownership of many of the means of production but who do not expect such a program to be the cure-all which orthodox socialism anticipates.

Those who wish to retain the name as it is feel the following to be true:

1. That the term is an adequate and true expression of the essential political convictions of the Fellowship and that no adequate synonym has been found.

2. That the Fellowship has never been identified with the Socialist party or with any other liberal party, though members of these parties are members of the Fellowship.

3. That the term "socialist" is not only meaningful in Europe but defines the political movement which expresses the convictions of the democratic masses of Europe. The victory of the British Labor Party would seem to give special emphasis to this argument.

4. The Fellowship wishes to maintain its distinctive character as a radical religious group and a change of name might ultimately dilute the membership and

change the basic convictions of the group.

None of the changes proposed at the June meeting seemed satisfactory. Some of the names proposed were: "Fellowship of Commonwealth Christians", "Fellowship of Christian Democracy", "Fellowship for a Christian Democracy".

Suggestions from our members and readers on this subject will be appreciated.

BOOK REVIEWS

FATE AND FREEDOM, by Jerome Frank. Simon and Schuster. \$3.00.

Jerome Frank is an unreconstructed liberal. Consequently his prescription for dealing with the problems of our times is not simply a formula in keeping with the traditional liberal attitude. Rather it is to present the attitude itself as the primary basis for creative living. It is a faith in human capacity, unalterably opposed to "fate" in any form which Frank sees as the foundation stone of a free society.

If Jerome Frank, Judge of the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and former Yale Law School faculty member, had written his book forty years ago, it would have been an accurate expression of the best progressive spirit of those times. For the kind of liberal spirit which he presents finds its being in terms of social advance, and it regards authority in itself as the symbol of the enemy. In this rather tragic sense, this book profoundly illuminates

the ideological limitations as well as the philosophical shortcomings of that significant element of the New Deal which the author represented for so many years.

The sub-title of "Fate and Freedom" is "A Faith for Free Americans". Together the two titles give the author's purpose in writing the book, with the main heading telling of the antagonist he intends to slay and the protagonist he will defend in the process. Judge Frank is out to eliminate all forms of determinism from any decisive influence in modern culture.

The enemies of modern man which chain his spirit, in the author's view, are as follows: the scientific approach to history—which here is made to include all forms of the philosophy of history which portray or imply any determinism; the spirit of asceticism in culture—the Greek-derived tendency to regard the contingent aspects of life as unreal; the principle of natural law, regardless

of the area in which it is used; and the scientific principle of inevitable causality which has dominated physics since Newton, and which has had a tremendous influence in social fields.

Against these enemies, the author would have the modern age build a faith in which the desire for uniformity is kept at a minimum, restricted to those political necessities necessary for maintaining governmental services; the humanism of Sir Thomas More, "democratized by Jefferson"; an attitude of speculative inquiry which is skeptical about its evidence and about itself; and a realization that change is a real factor in human affairs.

Frank recognizes the profound significance of many attempts to build systems of thought and action, both in philosophy and politics, as indicating fear and insecurity in a contingent world. He would have us realize that we tend to rationalize these fears and project them back upon the universe in our understanding of human nature and in our theories of world order. He would have us face the facts of the modern situation, both the reasons for our fears and the circumstances of the day as they appear to be, and find in so facing them the spiritual stimulus for creative living.

"We must reject the suggestion that we are but molecules in the wave of the future. We must assert our faith in the power of free men to preserve a civilization in which freedom will seem to have been inevitable—because free men have effectively willed that it should persist. We need to keep in mind the good old American belief that 'God helps him who helps himself'. In expressive Americanese, we must make good."

It would be inaccurate to label Frank a simple Utopian. He is too much of an instrumentalist to be a Utopian in any strict sense. He believes in progress and he believes in man's capacity. He does not believe in the inevitability of any development, but he believes in the possibility of the progressive creation of the good society through human effort in each successive generation.

In this light, he makes a plea for a new synthesis to be the basis for modern culture the way the mediaeval synthesis of Christian theology, feudal economics and social corporativeness was the cultural nexus of the 12th and 13th centuries. Judge Frank's synthesis would include: a belief in free will, democratic institutions, free play, and an inquiring mind, in which the individual and society would achieve a tolerable balance and find mutual satisfactions in spite of the trend toward increasing size in industrial organization.

Appended to the book are five essays which underline aspects of the author's thesis. The first declares that the curse of Communism is the Marxist theory of the historical dialectic as derived from Hegel. Without this theory the Marxist analysis of conditions would be an impetus for improvement while the Communist party would lose its warrant for opportunism. Theoretical Marxism is the author's extreme example of the kind of scientific history he abhors. The second is really for the purpose of showing the irrelevance of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation to the cultural process which created today's society. It is an attempt to refute the Weber-Tawney school of the relation of religion and capitalism. The other

essays deal with the refutation of natural law, self-evident truths and determinism.

In spite of the author's flippancy in some places and pretensions of omniscience in other places, "Fate and Freedom" is an interesting book. Christian Socialists will agree with many of the author's objectives, but the inadequacy of his fundamental philosophy will be apparent from the beginning to the end. The problems he sees and which he would attack are certainly real issues—there is no doubt that historical evidence is abused, the scientists have claimed too much, that the theory of natural law can be used to support the status quo or anything the user desires. The more serious recognition is that the very vehemence with which the author attacks these issues makes him rule out in advance any recognition of the cumulative problem of history, so that consequently the faith for which he pleads eloquently becomes more and more irrelevant to the world in which it is to be used.

Judge Frank's book is significant, not only for its scholarship which is wide and its scope which is tremendous, but primarily for its portrayal of the type of liberalism which he represents and which has been the motivating force for the progressive movement in America. "Fate and Freedom" reveals its strength: its refusal to accept premature systematizations of life or thought, particularly in politics, but also its profound limitations, its inability to have any appreciation of the nature and destiny of man except on a narrow stage of immediacies. Judge Frank's use of religion, particularly his back-handed blessing to Roman Catholicism in the last chapter and his essay on the irrelevance of religion in the appendices, is most revealing.

He would commend religion. He thinks he is providing a realistic setting for the Christian ethic. What he is actually doing is showing that the only contribution his type of liberal faith has to make to our disturbed generation is in the form of moralism.

CHARLES D. KEAN

THEY FOUND THE CHURCH THERE, by Henry P. Van Dusen. Scribners, 1945. 145 pp. \$1.75.

Professor Van Dusen has given us an amazingly straightforward and objective account of the findings of our armed services in the South Pacific Islands. In a way it is a continuation of the work Van Dusen started in *Toward the Healing of the Nations* and *What Is the Church Doing?* This little book is certainly a fit companion to the others.

In a very real sense this book is a chronicle of discovery. The Christian mission enterprise in the Pacific Islands, as in most of the areas of the Far East, has been subject to considerable criticism and abuse by the intellectual leaders of the churches at home. We have all read and listened to the reports that indicated the ineptness and tragic confusion of the foreign missionary. These men have been accused of taking Western Culture and not Christianity to their outposts. Most have been looked upon with contempt by those who claim to know "true religion" from "cultural religion." In many instances the critics have been right. Yet this little book indicates how wrong it is to make the criticism into a universal proposition. This chronicle of discovery by our military men is not one of "opinion or sentiment or partisanship"; rather, it states bald facts.

The documents Van Dusen uses point to the fact that the efforts of missionaries have actually changed the life and the attitude toward life of an enormous number of primitive peoples. Such simple attributes as kindness, charity, hospitality, reverence for life and even cleanliness have been inculcated by the missionaries. Elementary as these may seem to be, they represent, as Van Dusen clearly shows, a tremendous advance over the meanness and pettiness of pre-missionary days. It is to the author's credit that he does not claim too much. Those who seek perfection in the Christian faith will not find much comfort from these pages. Yet, those who are looking for signs of Christianity's life-transforming power will receive real solace from their reading of this book. Beyond its recitation of interesting stories and unique facts, it roundly affirms the vitality of present-day Christianity.

The book should be read by all Christian clergymen for comfort and information. It should not be read as theology. It should be read by all non-Christian humanists as an example of institutional religion's contribution to the betterment of life. After reading the scores of letters quoted, one could hardly disagree with the author when he concludes that "no enterprise in history aimed at the amelioration of humankind and the building of a fairer common life has ever received more decisive approbation."

JOHN R. EVERETT

DOOM AND CIVILIZATION, by Joseph L. Hromadka. Madrus House, Richmond, Virginia. 1945.

Those who have ever met, or heard Professor Hromadka speak, will naturally hurry to the bookstore when they

hear of his first book in the English language. They will want to see whether the man could introduce that sweet, personable, truly Christian disposition into a book, and couple with that disposition and character his very profound, existential insights into the Christian faith and life. Once they have glanced at the book they will discover that he has truly inserted himself into a book which obviously is one of the most profound explanations of certain highlights of Christianity.

On opening the book one can well be astonished and pleased to discover the dedication. An opening page carries a dedication "To Henry A. Wallace, a man of deep social and spiritual vision." Dr. Hromadka has elsewhere explained that he regards Mr. Wallace as the one man active in American political life who understands that the great social and political problem of our day is to maintain a healthy, and dynamic, balance between the development of collectivization and social security on the one hand, and freedom and liberty on the other.

But this book is far from being a Christian treatise on political affairs. It is rather a study of the depths and profundities of the Christian belief in the light (or is it darkness?) of the contemporary world. If the writing and construction of this particular book seems on occasion to be disjointed and irregular that is understandable in view of the fact that it is a collection of lectures and essays already delivered or published. That it does not read exactly smoothly is certainly understandable and fully forgiven for the subject matter, and the astute analyses, make up for any

possible shortcoming of composition or style.

All those acquainted with theological writings are familiar with the tribute given Hromadka by Walter Horton in his book on contemporary religious thought in Europe. Horton spoke of this expatriate Czech as the greatest Protestant thinker east of Karl Barth. The fact that he is Slavish adds further to his interest for the American reader. We shall obviously wish to know more and more of the Slavish mentality, and of the Slavish Christian mentality, in the future days of co-operation with the Russian government and people. In the Czech thought may lie some cues to a *via-media* of thought and action. In studying the writings of Dr. Radl and Dostoyevsky and the late President-philosopher Masaryk we may come to a clearer understanding of what lies at the depth of the soul of these as yet, to us, incomprehensible people. Hromadka gives us some insight into the thought of these three, as well as analyses of Kierkegaard and Barth whose thoughts have shaken the whole theological world and forced the modern philosopher to the recognition that theology is still a science worthy of consideration.

It is a joy to read this simple lucid prose. It is a pleasure to have the profundities of Radl and Masaryk, Dostoyevsky and Kierkegaard, Barth and the Crisis theologians so plainly stated. But more than the academic interest such a book as this present one may provide is the clear statement that here is a theologian who is plainly also a Christian! Not a too common phenomenon! Here is a sermon in six chapters! Here is a man taking his reading

congregation into the abyss of the appreciation of sinfulness and the horrible consequences! Here is a man who through Ritschl and Herrmann and Barth, through the re-reading of Dostoyevsky and Kierkegaard, came to the Damascus! But here is one whose eyes were also opened by the preaching of some Ananias who had known the Crucified and Resurrected.

Sermons like these are discovered only a few times in a lifetime. Professor Hromadka is preaching to the world, and the reading world which will bother to look into this book will be deeply rewarded with an insight into great thoughts, an understanding of the modern world, and a faith in the Risen Lord.

THE ANNIHILATION OF MAN, by
Leslie Paul. Harcourt Brace. 214 pp.
\$2.50.

Leslie Paul, about whom I know nothing except that he grew up under the shadow of the first World War and has had to fight in the British Army in this one, has written a book which is another attempt to analyze the dilemma of our society and to point the way out. Briefly stated, Mr. Paul's thesis is that various secular philosophies have become predominant in the world, and have, as his title indicates, annihilated man. We must recapture a religious philosophy which recognizes the true value of each man. For the author this is the Christian religion not so much because he is convinced that Christianity is the ultimate or the final revelation of God, but because "the culture to which we belong is Christian: and even if this faith is not the high-water mark of religious evolution its moral concepts are our inescapable heritage" (p. 194).

In many ways Mr. Paul has done us a helpful service. He is well read and is obviously trying to think his way honestly through the situation in which he finds himself. But it is a poorly balanced and somewhat meandering book. After starting with why Britain is at war he goes into a long attack on Marxism (theoretical Marxism of Marx and Engels). This takes nearly half the book. There is also a lengthy discussion of Fascism, and for one who deals with young people the chapter on the Revolt of German Youth is particularly provocative. Then very briefly he attacks Freudianism, Behaviorism, Darwinianism and exposes the limitation of the scientific attitude. All have contributed to the annihilation of man. The only hope then is in religion, and for our contemporary culture this means Christianity.

Such a summary treatment of this book may be a little unfair. For one who wants the arguments against Marxism here they are clearly stated and disposed of one by one, perhaps a little too neatly. The book is filled with many apt and interesting quotations. It is always readable and from this reviewer's point of view Mr. Paul comes out on the right side although his understanding of Christianity leaves something to be desired.

W. BURNETT EASTON, JR.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, AN INQUIRY, by *M. Searle Bates*. Harper Brothers. \$3.50.

This study of religious liberty, undertaken under the joint sponsorship of the

Federal Council of Churches and the Foreign Missions Conference, but completely written by Dr. Searle Bates of Nanking University is one of the most important religious studies of this decade. It examines the struggle for religious liberty in all the ages and gives a comprehensive survey of the status of religious freedom in every nation and culture of our own day.

With a diligent and carefully documented scholarship, Dr. Bates gives us an accurate account of just what the situation is in Russia, and in China, in Moslem lands and in India, and in every part of the Christian world. He carefully weighs the advantages and disadvantages of the "free church in the free state" solution of the problem and of such solutions as we find in Britain where one denomination has a special status but no religious monopoly. He recognizes the perils of tyranny in religious authoritarianism but also the dangers of complete secularism in the official indifference of the state to religion.

He shows how frequently religious liberty has been gained by groups who only wanted it for themselves and did not desire to establish it as a general principle; and how little reason any of us have to assume special credit for the growth of religious freedom. This book makes a very great contribution to the religious and political thought and life of our day.

R. N.

